INTRODUCTION
The WTO provides three critical services to the international trading system: a forum for multilateral negotiations, an apparatus to mediate the neutral arbitration of trade-related disputes between members, and the illumination of members' changes to policies that affect foreign commercial interests. And yet, discussions of reform to the WTO system rarely address the third pillar of monitoring and transparency. This paper examines the issue of information generation and the role of surveillance in the WTO system.
As motivation, one of the fundamental contributions of the WTO system's architecture is that it allows for substantial monitoring of changes to the national policies that have an impact on the conditions of foreign market access and hence, the flows of international trade. The WTO architecture has resulted in a system of rules as well as reporting requirements that makes it possible to transmit information concerning how one member's policy changes are expected to affect the foreign market access interests of exporters in other WTO Member economies. Monitoring may have never been more important for the sustainability of the rules-based trading system than during the height of the global economic crisis in 2008-2009. This paper addresses a number of questions related to the monitoring of the foreign market access interests of exporters in developing countries -especially those with profit margins so small relative to the gains from enforcement -most unlikely to devote the private resources to cover monitoring costs themselves. How does monitoring of their interests take place, and how does this compare to what theory suggests their strongest needs would be? As it is highly unlikely that developing country export interests are able to fully cover the needs themselves privately, is sufficiently detailed data and information being generated to enable other development-focused groups to step in to package the information into the format that is most useful to exporters' needs?
Finally, to what extent are groups monitoring and informing on the policy changes that might be violations of WTO commitments and thus potentially subject to action under WTO dispute settlement?
As an underlying theoretical motivation, a number of factors contribute to why private actors, and especially those associated with exporting interests in developing countries, do not spend sufficient resources on monitoring their own foreign market access interests. First, because monitoring is costly and generates positive externalities so that others can free-ride off the benefits, the lesson from basic economics is that private actors do not perceive the right incentives to devote sufficient resources to monitoring their own interests. Second, the introduction of other development-friendly initiatives such as the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), the developing country legal assistance centre established in 2001 that subsidises the cost of litigation of actual WTO disputes (but not the full cost of information generation), may have unintentionally deepened the disincentive for private sector law firms to do more monitoring on behalf of developing country exporters in particular. 1 The implication is that the international trading system is unlikely to have deployed either the optimal level or distribution of 1 See Bown (2009a, chapters 6 and 8) . The theoretical argument is that providing subsidised support for developing countries to cover WTO litigation expenses but not information generation (i.e. 'ambulance chasing') reduces the incentive for private law firms to dig up such information on WTO violations that may adversely affect developing country exporters because the law firms are less likely to obtain the exporter's actual (billable) litigation work as clients. This paper thus considers the present and future of monitoring in the WTO system, with a particular emphasis on the surveillance needs of developing countries in 2 Examples of early research initiatives taking stock of protectionist data trends during the crisis include Newfarmer and Gamberoni (2009 ), Bown (2009b , and other contributions in the collections of Baldwin and Evenett (2009 developing countries initiated 11 of these disputes on average per year (Bown, 2009a, pp. 65-70 In the third section, the discussion turns to a specific appraisal of the strongest immediate term needs for additional information generation, given the legacy of potential violations of WTO commitments over market access spurred by the global economic crisis of [2008] [2009] . The paper concludes by providing a reminder that while it is important to monitor and address any new crisis-generated trade barriers, developing country exporters have systemic monitoring needs whether or not the global economy is in crisis. Furthermore, some of these needs may change in the future depending on the conclusion of the Doha Round and any new multilateral agreements on climate change and border taxes.
THEORY AND INPUTS TO MONITORING WTO COMMITMENTS
This section briefly reviews the theory behind the importance of monitoring foreign market access commitments in the WTO system. We then discuss actual monitoring efforts undertaken in the WTO system, especially as such efforts have been changing in response to the global economic crisis of [2008] [2009] . Finally, we turn to how other groups might best utilise the data provided by these new initiatives to inform exporters in developing countries. Such exporters seek information on how changing policies may have affected their foreign market access interests and whether WTO dispute settlement is a viable possibility for them to engage with their policymakers to self-enforce their trading interests.
The theory behind public sector monitoring of WTO commitments
Any discussion of how best to structure public resources dedicated to the monitoring of international market access commitments must be grounded in theory. Here we draw on the theory provided in Bown (2009a) which considers the issue from the perspective of the exporting firm whose market access interests are at the heart of international trade.
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The exporting firm has expectations of access to foreign markets that its government negotiated on its behalf and which are bound into the foreign country's WTO commitments. Now it is up to the exporting firm and its advocates to keep the foreign market open, which sometimes means through self-enforcement and utilising the formal WTO process of dispute settlement.
In the theoretical model, the exporting firm needs the capacity to work with its government officials to potentially use WTO dispute settlement to self-enforce its access to foreign markets. Suppose a foreign government imposes a WTO-violating trade or trade-related measure that eliminates that firm's market access. We define 'monitoring' as the generation of sufficiently precise information on the cause of an exporter's loss of foreign market access and the benefit to this policy being reversed, so that the exporter can make an informed decision based on a cost-benefit analysis of whether to engage government policymakers to use formal WTO dispute settlement on its behalf. 5 Selfenforcement of any foreign market entails a cost. From an economic modelling perspective, this foreign-market specific cost is similar (though in addition) to what an exporting firm must spend to adapt and market its product to new foreign consumers, or to establish a new network to deliver it to them. The main difference between the cost of self-enforcement and these other costs of supplying to a foreign market is that the latter are entirely borne by the exporter, whereas self-enforcement costs are sometimes 'shared' because of the positive externalities generated. Because trade policies are typically quite blunt, the effort of keeping a foreign market open to one exporter has implications for other exporters as well. This possibility for sharing both creates an additional set of complications and generates a role for the public sector.
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For an exporter to use WTO dispute settlement to reopen a market that has been closed with a WTO-violating policy, the first step is to generate technical information on the cause of lost foreign market access, compiled from economic, legal and political expertise. 7 The legal information is evidence of a violation of WTO commitments or obligations. There are at least two needs for economic information, including both the economic importance of the WTO-violating cause of lost exports and the economic assurance that any WTO violation was both an important cause of the lost exports and that the loss was not caused by a (simultaneous) change in alternative factors unrelated to the violation -e.g., a recession, increased competition from fair alternative (foreign or domestic) sources, or something else. Finally, the political information includes estimated probabilities that the foreign country will engage in policy reform and compliance with potential WTO rulings, as well as the potential form of the compliance and whether that is likely to result in substantial additional market access.
The generation of such information requires technical expertise in economics, law and politics. This information is costly for the exporter to acquire, though the argument is that in a self-enforcing system like the WTO, this information must be available to the exporter to successfully and sustainably engage in international trade. In many developed countries, the evidence is that firms have been able to overcome the cost hurdle of generating this information through a combination of at least three routes: 1) they are sufficiently profitable to pay private actors to monitor their own foreign market access interests; 2) they have organised with other local exporting firms cost-sharing arrangements by forming industry and trade associations to monitor common foreign 7 We present our discussion through the lens of WTO dispute settlement. However, there are other mechanisms that serve as complements to formal dispute settlement which could also benefit from the additional generation of technical information. Examples include various committees within the WTO, as well as external networks of technical officials and standard-setting groups, such as Codex Alimentarius.
For a discussion, see Hoekman and Kostecki (2009 developing countries do not have such a sophisticated system in place. This is not to suggest that devoting resources at the national level is the optimal approach, this is merely to provide evidence that national governments in industrialised countries have recognised the need for the public sector to provide additional monitoring of WTO commitments and this is how they have chosen to respond. Our proposal below presents an alternative approach where monitoring is not constrained to take place at the national level.
identified above -i.e., to create and package additional information of use to exporters in developing countries whose monitoring needs are insufficiently addressed -whether that is because their exported products were: 1) not profitable enough for them to bear the costs privately; or the firms were unable to reduce the cost burden by cost-sharing 2) with other firms because of the inability to organise into trade associations and/or 3) with their government, because the government did not have the institutional infrastructure in place to provide those services. The proposed information generation services of the IAWC would complement other development-focused initiatives in the WTO system, such as the 2001 establishment of the independent Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), the main legal assistance centre for developing countries in the WTO system. taking on this role. First, the WTO was not given the mandate to provide sufficiently detailed information on changes in policies to be of use to private sector agents -whether it be a firm or an advocate working on its behalf. 13 Second, given its other important roles in the system, it may be politically quite difficult for the WTO Secretariat to play an active monitoring and information generation role.
The global economic crisis took hold in late 2008, and by early 2009 a number of new initiatives provided additional information and data of use to the monitoring agenda.
Much of the information could be especially useful for those interested in improving understanding of changes to the foreign market access opportunities facing exporters in developing countries. Table 1 that, despite a measure being included in the document, the WTO itself was not making any judgment as to its potential consistency with any commitments or obligations.
14 13 Consider a policy like antidumping -the information that the WTO reports on behalf of its member countries is neither timely (it arrives with a substantial lag) or detailed enough (no tariff-line codes of products affected) to be of use to analysts seeking to make sense of the economic market implications of the potential barrier.
14 Footnote 1 of the April 20 list (WTO document WT/TPR/OV/W/1) states: 'This is intended to be a purely factual report and is issued under the sole responsibility of the Director-General. It has no legal While the lists were quite a useful first step, they nevertheless still generated few additional details that could be used by an analyst to help determine whether such a measure was an economically important cause of a reduction to its country's exports. actions. Perhaps government officials would think twice about how they structured new policy initiatives if they were concerned that the GTA would flag their policies with a red triangle that indicated 'the measure has been implemented and almost certainly discriminates against foreign commercial interests.' Nevertheless, the publicity around the GTA has resulted in critics of its own. Some focused on the utility of the information being provided for understanding the scale of the spread of protectionism taking hold during the global crisis, given the lack of comparable pre-crisis data available to use as a benchmark. Others argued that the GTA was overstating the incidence of protectionism which could provide fodder and cover for other policymakers interested in increasing 16 For a discussion see Evenett (2009 future protectionism. 17 We do not address such critiques here. Instead, the next section focuses on how groups might use the tremendous amount of information compiled into the GTA and the Global Antidumping Database to improve the quality of information provided to developing country exporters in the WTO system regarding the potential infringement of their market access rights.
The four questions that information generated from these new initiatives could help answer
The GTA and Global Antidumping Database provide raw data and information. Their main contributions to date were not to perform the technically demanding task of packaging the raw information into the format needed for exporters and their advocates in developing countries in the context of potential WTO dispute settlement. Here we address the question of how others can adapt the information now available to put it to good use.
Begin with the considerable GTA efforts of identifying trade-related measures, and its approach of 'red flagging' certain measures based on whether they are likely to have a negative impact on foreign commercial interests. For an exporting firm in a developing country and its advocates to make a sufficiently informed cost-benefit analysis of whether to use WTO dispute settlement to attempt to reopen a market that was closed off during the crisis, they require answers to at least four questions:
17 Criticisms of the GTA and the impact of such monitoring activity during the crisis include Rodrik (1) What is the likelihood of a WTO finding of a legal inconsistency of any particular measure?
(2) How large is the lost foreign market access at stake? If resources were not a constraint, the idea would be to take every red-flagged measure in the GTA database, as well as every imposed antidumping, countervailing duty, or safeguard measure found in the Global Antidumping Database, and to evaluate each according to the answers to these four questions. Specifically, an analyst would use legal expertise to clarify the likelihood that the existing WTO jurisprudence would determine that there has been a violation of commitments. Then she would take the information on the HS codes and match them to trade flow data to determine how much market access is at stake. Third, additional economic expertise would be used in an attempt to clarify the extent to which the new trade barrier was the cause of the lost market access as opposed to being due to some other cause. 18 Finally, legal and political expertise would be 18 Admittedly, disentangling the economic impact of any potential WTO violations from other causes may be quite challenging given the environment generated by the timing of the global economic crisis. For example, there was tremendous volatility and turmoil in markets during [2008] [2009] , and in many instances it may be difficult to distinguish the impact of a WTO-violating policy from other 'natural' economic activity that was simultaneously taking place -e.g., the negative demand shock associated with the combined to assign a probability to the likelihood that the policy-imposing country will comply with WTO rulings and implement a change in policy that results in market access.
In economic terms, the purpose of combining such economic, legal and political expertise is to provide the exporting firm with an expected value of the payoff to pursuing a WTO dispute, so that the firm can weigh that expected benefit against the expected cost of engaging in WTO dispute settlement. 19 Only an exporter that is informed about the expected benefits and costs of engaging the WTO's self-enforcement system can make rational decisions regarding whether to use it.
This section has presented a basic template by which experts in economics, law, and politics would band together to use data provided by monitoring initiatives such as the Global Antidumping Database and GTA to generate and better package information of use to exporters in developing countries. We have not yet addressed the reality of resource limitations and the need for public good-minded analysts to prioritise their efforts based on (i) the (demand side) needs of particular interest to developing countries,
(ii) the types of trade barriers being imposed (supply side), and (iii) the largest gap of recession. Furthermore, consider an example like the US bailout of the automobile sector that we discuss in more detail below. In this case, there was an almost simultaneous demand shock (in 2008) induced by high petrol prices and increased recognition of the impact of climate change that may have changed the tastes and preferences of consumers towards different types (of more fuel-efficient) cars. 19 Of course an expected value is only one summary statistic -the exporter is also likely to be interested in the statistical distribution of possible outcomes to a potential dispute. This includes its expected payoff under various forms of 'partial' compliance, whether that partiality in compliance is due to differences in the timing of implementation or the completeness with which the trade barrier is removed. missing information that is not being generated by other sources, such as private firms themselves. This is the focus of the next section.
MONITORING NEEDS DUE TO POTENTIAL CRISIS-INDUCED ABUSES OF WTO COMMITMENTS
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 resulted in a severe economic recession in many countries that heightened political pressure to respond with new policy initiatives. In the face of increased political pressure to respond quickly, it is likely that governments increased the amount of policymaking activity that would both adversely affect foreigner's market access and violate WTO commitments, and that this activity would be above even the 'normal' levels that take place under calmer economic conditions. Below Because there are dozens and perhaps hundreds of new crisis-era policies alone that could be subject to the additional analytical scrutiny of 'monitoring' by the technical experts (economists, lawyers and political scientists) best suited to advising developing country exporters, we also provide an analytical discussion of which policies should be subject to such additional scrutiny. From the demand-side perspective, we focus on developing countries and their small profit-margin industries -i.e., firms for which it is unlikely that sufficient extra resources are available to coordinate politically and engage in the self-monitoring that may occur through trade associations or national governments on their behalf. Within the supply side of new trade-restricting policies to consider, our decision on where to apply additional analytical public resources is guided by a focus on potential WTO violations of national treatment, or a policy that discriminates between domestic firms and foreign firms. These are the policies likely to affect many diffuse exporters; i.e., policies to which challenges are otherwise least likely because the coordination across many foreign interests is most difficult.
Before turning to the three categories of policies identified above, it is worth repeating that the data and information generated by initiatives such as the GTA, Global
Antidumping Database, and the WTO Secretariat are still primitive and merely an input for others to use. These sources admittedly provide little information on the key questions (1) through (4) identified above. Teams of economists, lawyers and political analysts with technical expertise must work together to match up the primitive data from these sources with more detailed information on trade flows, market conditions, and industry and firm performance. With respect to any potential trade barrier identified by these initiatives, exporting firms and their government policymakers require answers to these four questions in order to make the larger expected cost-benefit calculation. Without this information they will be unable make a rational determination of whether to raise the issue of a potential WTO violation with trading partners; and subsequently whether to bring this matter to the WTO, potentially for dispute settlement.
Crisis-induced abuses of trade remedies?
In times of economic downturn, it is common for domestic industries to petition their governments under trade remedy laws such as antidumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards for new import-protecting measures (Knetter and Prusa, 2003; Irwin, 2005) .
As Are such potential abuses of importance to developing country exports? Given that roughly 75% of the trade remedy investigations and measures (that are exporting country specific, such as antidumping, CVD and China-specific safeguards) imposed during the crisis have targeted developing countries and that these are increasing compared to pre-crisis levels (Bown, 2010) , this would suggest that they are important. However, the main question is whether additional public resources should be devoted to providing answers to the technical questions (1) through (4) raised above concerning trade remedies imposed during the crisis. Perhaps surprisingly, if the discussion of the next two sections reveals that there are many additional types of trade barriers that require publicly-assisted scrutiny, the answer to this question may be no.
Despite these trade barriers being important for developing country exporters to target, there are at least three reasons why they should not necessarily be subject to additional publicly-funded scrutiny that would come at the expense of a closer examination of other crisis-era trade barriers. First, of all the trade barriers, trade remedies are possibly the easiest for any exporting firm (that has been hit by them) to understand and for it then to demonstrate to its government that it has been adversely affected by a potential economically important WTO violation. Indeed the evidence from the pre-crisis use of WTO dispute settlement indicates that even without any new public assistance monitoring, many developing countries have logged a strong record of successfully engaging the WTO dispute settlement system to challenge imposed trade remedies. Second, an additional concern that we have not yet addressed is that limited public resources may best target the sorts of trade barriers imposed during the crisis that are least likely to be removed on their own. While one should not go so far as to say that imposed trade remedies are automatically removed, the WTO Agreements describing how they are to be used contain sunset provisions (antidumping, CVD) or phase-outs (safeguards), and this increases the chance that trade remedies imposed during the crisis will eventually be removed without resort to WTO dispute settlement. How might an analyst use the GTA database to construct answers for the four key questions regarding the expected impact of a new trade barrier? To address this question, we go through the exercise of examining a specific example of a GTA announcement.
Consider the Brazilian government's decision in August 2009 to increase its ad-valorem import duty from 2% to 14% for industrial fatty alcohols. 21 First, the GTA takes care to note that the average bound tariff of the products concerned is 35% and that the products were on the list of exceptions of Mercosur's common external tariff, and they are now back to their original rate. Thus a simple examination of this information suggests that while Brazil may have imposed a new import restriction with this applied tariff increase, there is no obvious WTO violation -e.g., such as when a country increases its applied tariff above the binding rate. Regarding the first question of whether such a measure is likely be legally challengeable at the WTO, since there is no evidence to suggest a violation, the analyst might stop there and move on to assessing the next measure on the GTA list.
However, suppose just for the sake of our hypothetical exercise that the Brazilian tariff increase on industrial fatty alcohols did contain a potential WTO violation that satisfied question (1). How could an analyst begin to use the data provided by the GTA to address the other three questions to which answers are needed for an exporter or its advocate to make an informed cost-benefit assessment of whether to engage in WTO dispute settlement? Because the GTA also explicitly identifies the HS codes at issue under the measure, an outside analyst could take this information and answer question (2) 21 See Global Trade Alert 'Brazil: tariff increase from 2% to 14% on industrial fatty alcohols,' Measure #1035, Published 17 Dec 2009. The tariff lines that the GTA reports as being raised are for products -i.e., the size of the market at stake and the likely importance of this market to foreign exporters in developing countries.
In table 3 we address this question by taking the information on the 6-digit HS product codes that the GTA provides and matching them to import data made available for free on the Internet by the United Nations through Comtrade. 22 First, are developing country exporters affected by this measure? The answer is clearly yes, as five out the top seven foreign sources of Brazilian imports of this product in recent years were developing countries (India, Indonesia, Malaysia, China and South Africa). Second, how large were these exports and was there a substantial reduction in exports associated with the new trade barrier? For these five developing countries, annual exports prior to the crisis were not trivial, as they ranged from US$ 2 million to US$ 16 million per country per year, which is well within the range of the size of exports associated with a number of disputes recently initiated by developing countries. 23 While Brazilian imports from each of these sources did fall substantially in 2009, as indicated earlier, it may be hard to attribute this (without more information) to the Brazilian tariff increase, given the 3823.70.10 and 3823.70.20. 22 In this particular case the measure was applied at the 8-digit level, and since the UN data is only provided at the 6-digit HS level there may be some mismeasurement. complainant standard threshold for pursuing WTO disputes; thus it is unlikely that these industrialised countries would put a priority on using litigation over this particular
Brazilian measure.
The implication of this exercise is, had the assessment of question (1) resulted in a WTO violation, using the information provided by the GTA matched to publicly available trade data to assess question (2) suggests that this measure might be one that a development-focused outside analyst would want to generate more information on so as to assist the adversely affected exporters in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, China, and South Africa. Furthermore, it is important to point out that because of the work already provided by the GTA, with the free data from UN Comtrade available on the Internet, it took us less than 30 minutes to provide a quick snapshot answer to this question.
24 This is also likely given that the GTA reports the Brazilian tariff increase only took place at the end of August, meaning that eight months worth of 2009 imports of this product came in under the 2% tariff. Thus additional work and information would be needed to answer questions (3) and (4), if the information revealed by answering question (2) indicated that this particular measure was worth looking at in more detail.
Finally, consider again figure 2b which indicates that between 1995 and 2008, these other types of import border measure were the second most frequent (after trade remedies) subject of formal WTO dispute settlement challenges by developing countries.
Based on evidence from the historical pattern of WTO dispute settlement, it is likely that crisis-era border measures such as new tariffs, import quotas and bans, as well as changes to procedures for licensing or customs evaluation are likely to result in new disputes initiated by developing countries on behalf of their exporters.
Crisis-induced abuses of subsidies and other behind the border measures?
The macroeconomic crisis and the threat of a deepening recession in 2008-2009 led many governments to adopt interventionist fiscal policies and impose other behind the border measures that may have had an impact on foreign market-access commitments in WTO-inconsistent ways. Again, the statistics compiled from the GTA (table 2) provide evidence of a number of measures that analysts could investigate systematically by sequentially addressing the technical questions (1) through (4) There is also the concern about competitive devaluation of currencies, especially those that may be giving an advantage to exporters in one country at the expense of exporters (and competing local producers) in other economies. Finally, indirect evidence of increased subsidy use is also consistent with the trade remedy data observed and described in the last section (Bown, 2010) , and in particular the increasing resort to countervailing measures being sought by industries that Admittedly, the question of whether each of these applied policies are WTOillegal trade barriers (question 1) is quite complex and may be more complicated to answer accurately than in the case of the other import border measures described earlier.
Thus, when it comes to the question of how a development-focused outside analyst would go about addressing these four critical questions of interest to exporters, it may be more efficient to begin by tackling question (2) rather than question (1) and using it as the first screen to determine which measures not to pursue. That is, focus first on the economic question of whether any particular behind-the-border measure that the GTA has identified as potentially affecting trade has a large impact on exporters in developing countries.
Only if this question is answered affirmatively should the more complex question (1) of WTO-legality and jurisprudence be addressed.
Because these sorts of behind-the-border policies are the most complex and difficult to understand -both for legal and economic reasons -this is the main area where the public sector needs to step in to provide and package more useful information for exporters and their advocates in developing countries. Indeed, evidence from the data on the historical pattern of WTO dispute initiation over 1995-2008 (figure 2b) , indicates that while there have been a number of WTO disputes over subsidies and other behindthe-border measures, very few of them have been brought by developing countries.
CONCLUSIONS AND A REMINDER NOT TO FORGET PERMANENT AND FUTURE MONITORING NEEDS
This paper has focused on the issue of monitoring the foreign market access interests of the most vulnerable traders in the WTO system, i.e., the exporters in developing countries. These are the groups with insufficient resources to self-monitor their own foreign market interests, and for whom monitoring is a critical input if they hope to be able to self-enforce their WTO interests through formal dispute settlement. We have used economic theory to best identify their monitoring needs, and we have identified a number of new initiatives spurred on by the global economic crisis of 2008-2009 that have generated important new informational inputs useful for the monitoring agenda. We have then described how outside analysts can use these information inputs to help developing country exporters and their advocates sort through the legacy of potential WTO-violating policies resulting from crisis-era pressures of protectionism and potentially engage the WTO dispute settlement process to reopen foreign markets that were shut down.
It is important to recognise that while the global economic crisis has created a political opportunity to expand the monitoring agenda, especially to address the needs of exporters in developing countries, their needs will not disappear once the crisis has subsided. While the policy initiatives that tend to threaten the foreign markets of developing country exporters may change with the conclusion of the crisis, their need for informational assistance and continued vigilance will continue.
Finally, it is important to note that our focus on the crisis has forced us to also ignore a number of likely future monitoring needs of developing countries. For example, any positive conclusion to the Doha Round of multilateral negotiations will result in WTO Members taking on new commitments. In many instances the implementation may involve feet-dragging as it will take place in the most politically sensitive sectors and products -i.e., for many industrialised countries, these are the last 'holdouts' to liberalisation after more than 60 years of multilateral tariff cutting in the GATT/WTO system. Furthermore, any agreement establishing consensus rules on issues such as climate change and border taxes is likely to generate important monitoring needs on behalf of developing country exporters that we have not addressed either. Source: Figure 2a is Bown (2009a, figure 4-7 p. 80) . Figure 2b is Bown (2009a, figure 4-6 p. 79) .
